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Since mid-2007, public authorities in the European Union have 
broadly met the challenge of ensuring a functional degree of 
liquidity and preventing financial meltdown. The Eurosystem 
has even been ahead of the curve compared with the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England in discounting early on a wide 
variety of assets to a range of counterparties. However, despite 
unprecedented central bank intervention, extensive government 
guarantees since October 2008, and macroeconomic assistance 
(with  the  International  Monetary  Fund)  to  the  European 
Union’s weakest member states, the underlying state of conti-
nental Europe’s banking industry remains very fragile.  
The health of banks means a lot to the European economy. 
The European Union is far more reliant than the United States 
on bank credit (figure ) and on bank intermediation of savings. 
As of 2007, 34 percent of EU household financial assets were 
currency  and  deposits  (27  percent  in  the  United  Kingdom,   
37.5 percent in the euro area), mostly bank-held, compared with 
less than 5 percent in the United States.2 Banks also represent a 
larger share of the overall corporate landscape in the European 
Union. By mid-2007, they represented no less than 24 percent 
of the aggregate market value of European listed companies 
among the world’s largest 500, compared with only 6 percent 
in the United States (by March 3, 2009, these proportions had 
halved to 2 and 8 percent, respectively).3 
Healing  the  banking  system  is  therefore  crucial  for 
sustained recovery in Europe. Lingering banking fragility would 
result in recurrent disruption or misallocation of bank credit 
and would have a sizable negative impact on economic activ-
ity, depressing investment. Monetary policy and asset guarantee 
measures, which steepen the yield curve and increase banks’ 
margins,  would  play  to  the  detriment  of  savers,  depressing 
consumption. Ongoing fragility will not just depress aggregate 
demand through these two channels but also harm European 
trend productivity growth by skipping some investment and 
R&D cycles, misallocating capital to lower-return projects, and 
wasting human capital by consigning some workers to long-
term  unemployment  (Posen  2009  and  Pisani-Ferry  and  van 
Pottelsberghe 2009). Conversely, there is, at least in this crisis, 
no convincing evidence that continental Europe’s reliance on 
banks has delivered more financial stability than the more secu-
ritized finance of the United States and the United Kingdom. 
How big is Europe’s banking problem? There is not enough 
. The United Kingdom faces a distinct situation, which is not specifically 
addressed in this policy brief.
2. Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat and country flow-of-funds reports.
3. Authors’ calculations based on FT Global 500 rankings.
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transparency  to  provide  an  uncontroversial  answer.  Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates anticipate big losses in 
euro area–headquartered banks (figure 2). A team of economists 
at Goldman Sachs have also independently come to a similar 
figure of €569 billion in as yet unrecognized losses (Broadbent 
et al. 2009). Even allowing for more optimistic scenarios, there 
is no escaping the great magnitude of the losses to come for 
continental Europe’s banks, illustrated by the slightly steeper 
decline in the aggregate market value of large European listed 
banks  compared  with  their  US  counterparts  since  the  crisis 
started (figure 3). These losses portend bank insolvencies, since 
the projected losses are too large to be fully compensated for by 
future retained earnings, especially as they are likely to be very 
unevenly distributed among banks. 
Figure  4  compares  market  indicators  of  liquidity  and 
solvency  risk.  It  illustrates  the  success  of  liquidity  provision 
Figure 1     Bank versus other sources of capital, end-2007
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Figure 2     Bank writedowns, past and future
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009.
*Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
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since the turmoil following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, 
but also the persistent perception of insolvency risk, even after 
the  remarkable  easing  since  March  2009.  Major  European 
banks  cannot  be  considered  in  more  robust  condition  now 
than in late 2008, and a number of them are likely to be either 
insolvent or seriously undercapitalized, though which banks are 
thus afflicted cannot be determined on the basis of currently 
available public information. 
The magnitude of the problem, however, does not guaran-
tee a prompt policy response. Elected officials typically find it 
hard to garner the political will to take tough measures to deal 
with banking difficulties when forbearance is an easier short-
term option. The inaction of the US government during the 
980s savings and loan (S&L) crisis, and the Japanese govern-
ment during the 990s, illustrate this difficulty (Mikitani and 
Posen 2000). In continental Europe, the centrality of banking 
and the high number of people it employs make the situation 
more acute.  
Nor are market pressures likely to prompt proactive policy 
action.  Current  state  guarantees  remove  pressure  on  weaker 
institutions from depositors. Central banks’ liquidity provision 
has saved the macroeconomy but has also eroded discipline. 
The perceived availability of generous government bailouts, at 
least for the first few banks to face problems, also relieves equity 
market pressure. Furthermore, politically induced moves away 
from “fair-value” accounting shift the scrutiny from individual 
bank balance sheets to the entire financial system, which brings 
a far more damaging air of uncertainty. European policymakers 
have so far insufficiently acknowledged the resulting challenge.  
THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN APPROACH TO TRIAGE 
AND RESOLUTION 
Systemic banking crises are especially difficult to address, because 
they cast doubt on all banks simultaneously. Yet policymakers 
prefer that general drag to having to close specific banks. Failure 
to confront the problem, though, only aggravates the crisis. 
A key aim is to allow the marketplace to differentiate among 
banks and to regain trust in those sound enough to continue 
their  operations  without  major  change,  while  unsustainable 
banks are duly restructured.4   
4. Adam Posen, “A Proven Framework to End the US Banking Crisis Includ-
ing Some Temporary Nationalizations,” testimony before the US Congress, 
Washington, February 26, 2009.
Healing the banking system is crucial 
for sustained recovery in Europe.
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Figure 4     Market assessment of liquidity and solvency risk
a. Banks headquartered in the euro area
basis points
Sources: Datastream; European Banking Federation; British Banking Association, series ending June 2, 2009.  
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Triage5 necessarily involves a system-wide assessment of the 
solidity and long-term viability of all or most key banks on a 
comparative basis using a consistent methodology. In times of 
crisis, accounting information as appears in the banks’ published 
financial statements is of limited use, because the usual incen-
tives for issuers to provide high-quality disclosure are weakened. 
Triage cannot be spontaneous and market-driven and has to be 
a specific process initiated by public authorities to deliver the 
required reliability and comparability.  
None of the major banking crises of the last few decades 
in developed economies has been ultimately overcome without 
something akin to a triage process, and the later it comes, the 
greater the economic cost of the crisis. In the United States in 
989, it took the form of an overhauled regulatory framework 
and a Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to restructure failed 
S&L  associations.  Sweden  in  993  created  a  Bank  Support 
Authority (BSA) to assess banks’ assets and take over owner-
ship of those found insolvent.6 In Japan, the Financial Services 
Agency  in  2002–03  launched  “special  inspections”  of  the 
major banks, and harsh measures imposed on undercapitalized 
banks eventually led to recovery. By contrast, approaches that 
focused on the state buying assets deemed “toxic” from banks 
still in private ownership played a marginal role, if any (see, 
for example, Hoshi and Kashyap 2007). The term “bad banks” 
sometimes used to describe such approaches can be misleading, 
as those “bad banks” set up in Sweden in 992–93 involved no 
transfer of assets to the state in situations where there had not 
been prior full nationalization.7 
Triage has not started in continental Europe. On the basis 
of general principles agreed to in October 2008 and under the 
control  of  the  European  Commission’s  Directorate-General 
for  Competition,  member  states  have  injected  capital  into 
many banking groups. The De Larosière Report to the Euro-
5. Analogous to the medical term used to describe the process of prioritizing 
casualties for treatment in an emergency situation based on the severity of 
their conditions.
6. Urban Bäckström, “The Swedish Experience,” speech at the Federal Reserve 
Symposium in Jackson Hole, August 997, available at www.riksbank.se.
7. Leif Pagrotsky, “Sweden May Not Be a Model,” Euro Intelligence, February 
2, 2009, www.eurointelligence.com.
pean Commission (February 2009) called for consistent crisis 
management but focused on mid- to long-term institutional 
responses. In May 2009 the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) announced that tests would be conducted 
in each EU member state on the basis of “common scenarios 
and  guidelines,”8  but  specified  that  “this  is  not  a  stress  test 
to identify individual banks” and that “the outcomes [would 
remain] confidential,” meaning no effective triage process. By 
comparison, the US stress tests completed in early May 2009 
have given markets a means of improving their understanding of 
the respective strengths and vulnerabilities of major US banks.  
Could triage be done successfully in Europe on a coun-
try-by-country basis? There are certainly strong political forces 
against a supranational approach. National governments (and 
ultimately, taxpayers) have to pay for the upfront costs of any 
recapitalization.  Bank  supervision  is  also  presently  primarily 
national. Bank shareholders and management tend to make 
their case for bailouts to national politicians, whether as multi-
nationals  claiming  to  boost  the  country’s  image  or  as  local 
banks purporting to provide capital on favorable terms to local 
communities and projects. The increasingly fervent discussion 
over financial nationalism of late reflects these incentives. Finally, 
governments’ antipathy to fiscal federalism makes collaboration 
on banking crisis resolution a reflexively unappealing prospect, 
as was clear when appeals for an “EU bank fund” were rejected 
in the dramatic early days of October 2008.9  
However,  Europe’s  current  banking  problem  must  be 
tackled cross-nationally for two key reasons, both linked to the 
advanced (albeit far from complete0) cross-border integration 
of Europe’s financial systems, as figure 5 illustrates. 
First, only centralized balance sheet assessment and stress 
testing can effectively restore trust. Not only must standards 
conform in principle to “harmonized parameters” (IMF 2009) 
but also their implementation must be uniform in practice. 
Given the incentives, decentralized implementation is a recipe 
for gaming of the system and ultimately ineffectiveness. Under 
the seemingly patriotic imperative to protect local “champions,” 
national authorities would be too lenient on “their” banks in 
order  to  support  them  in  the  competition  with  peers  from 
neighboring countries. A supervisory race to the bottom would 
ensue. But a proper triage process must include a willingness 
to put an unflattering spotlight on banks found too weak and 
apply the same discount to identical distressed assets irrespective 
of country of issuer (the same considerations also justify contin-
ued vigilance by the Directorate-General for Competition).  
8. Statement on Stress Testing Exercise, May 2, 2009, www.c-ebs.org.
9. See, for example, the “Open Letter to European Leaders on Europe’s Bank-
ing Crisis: A Call to Action,” October , 2008, available at www.voxeu.org.
0. See Gropp and Kashyap (2009).
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Second,  the  high  risk  of  cross-border  bank  insolvency 
requires  a  supranational  approach  to  crisis  management,  as 
the  addition  of  ad  hoc  national  measures  has  been  proven 
inadequate to handle such situations. This risk was generally 
not a major concern in past financial crises, because the degree 
of  cross-border  banking  integration  remained  limited.  The 
systemic banking crises in Spain (started 977), the United 
States (988), Finland, Norway, and Sweden (99), and Japan 
(997)  were  essentially  national  in  scope.  Otherwise,  only 
three significant multinational banks have failed since 970. 
While the failure of Herstatt Bank (974) led to the formation 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and upgrad-
ing of settlement systems, those of BCCI (99) and Barings 
(995) did not result in significant international reform, in spite 
of serious dysfunction of cross-border cooperation. But the risk 
landscape has now been profoundly affected by financial and 
banking integration (Véron 2007). 
Post-Lehman,  normal  insolvency  proceedings  cannot 
be envisaged for systemically important banks. Thus, ad hoc, 
. These are all the systemic crises in developed economies since 970, based 
on Laeven and Valencia (2008).
out-of-court  solutions  must  be  devised  to  manage  failures. 
As cases such as Fortis or Hypo Real Estate have illustrated, 
this is a challenge irrespective of the cross-border dimension; 
among EU countries, only Italy and the United Kingdom have 
a special insolvency regime for banks. For a multinational bank, 
any home government–led resolution would create a high risk 
of unfair treatment of nondomestic stakeholders, as in the case 
of Iceland, which in 2008 nationalized banks and froze the 
accounts of foreign clients, who were more numerous than its 
total population. Similarly, home country–led resolution of a 
Western European bank with large operations in Central and 
Eastern Europe may create a politically disruptive discrepancy 
between home and host countries. Another option, the joint 
management of the ailing bank by several countries concerned, 
is also impractical. This is what Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands attempted with Fortis when it was considered unvi-
able in late September 2008, but cooperation collapsed after 
a few days due to incompatible domestic political pressures. 
Moreover, any future cases may be more difficult to handle than 
Fortis, which had quality assets and operated in countries with 
long experience of mutual cooperation. 
Also, pooling the management of distressed assets and bank 
Figure 5     Average internationalization of large banks
percent share of total revenue
Source: 2008 revenue based on Worldscope data, company reports, SEC filings, and authors’ assumptions. For two banks in the continental European 
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shares and securities in public ownership at the European level is 
the only way to have true price discovery and sufficiently deep, 
liquid markets for such securities, thus preparing the ground 
for eventual exit. 
Triage and resolution therefore have to be centralized at the 
supranational level. Otherwise it will not work. Policymakers 
have so far refused to acknowledge this reality. This is not just 
due to Britain’s sovereignism, France’s economic nationalism, 
the Czech Republic’s Euroskepticism, or Germany’s politicized 
banking system and ongoing election campaign. The difficulty 
is compounded by deep institutional mismatch, as none of the 
existing supranational institutions in the European Union is 
well suited to the task. The European Commission’s Director-
ate-General for Competition has played a key role in develop-
ments so far, but its mandate is about competition, not financial 
stability. More generally, the Commission does not currently 
have the operational or political capacity to take over the triage 
task; neither does the European Investment Bank. For the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), banking triage would arguably be 
incompatible with the independence needed for its monetary 
policy mission and would certainly be outside its staff’s primary 
responsibilities.  Existing  bank-specific  “colleges”  of  supervi-
sors do not provide the required central authority. CEBS has 
very few staff, and its current governance is ill-suited to the 
public responsibility that triage would entail (and the authority 
suggested by the De Larosière Report to replace it will take a 
long time to establish). Existing global entities, including the 
Financial Stability Board, are even less suited to the triage task.   
A new instrument is needed. This is not unprecedented. 
European-level evaluation of private entities for safety or impact 
is accepted in many areas, such as environmental or consumer 
regulation, even where there are implications at the national 
level for expenditure. The absence of funding at the European 
level for the requirements of judgments made supranationally 
(beyond the trivial salaries and operations of the supervisors) is 
not a barrier to making those judgments. If anything, the case 
for doing so is stronger in an integrated financial market, where 
the problems of one nation’s banks can rapidly spill over into 
another or all nations’ economies. What may look costly as an 
on-budget mandate to national governments to spend money is 
actually much less costly than allowing the banking fragility to 
continue to drag down and distort all of Europe’s economies. 
And there is an additional risk of damaging market fragmenta-
tion if the current policy paralysis continues.  
HOW TO DO IT: A TEMPORARY EUROPEAN BANK 
“TREUHAND” 
We propose the creation of a temporary supranational agency 
or Treuhand2 for a limited period of, say, five years. Ideally this 
agency may be established by all EU countries jointly, but it 
is more realistic to rely only on the endorsement and support 
of those member states where the headquarters of most banks 
active in the entire European Union are located. “Critical mass” 
would arguably entail the participation of Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and possibly Spain 
and Sweden, but not necessarily the United Kingdom as large 
British banks have only limited presence in other EU countries. 
Whether Switzerland may become an affiliate member could be 
discussed.  
Functionally, this structure parallels that of the previously 
mentioned US RTC and Swedish BSA. It is also designed to 
respect the subsidiarity principle and minimize political obsta-
cles. Political qualms cannot be permitted to keep Europe in a 
lost decade as occurred in Japan. Crucially, the proposal does 
not require EU-level treaty provisions or binding steps towards 
fiscal  federalism.    The  Treuhand  would  have  three  clearly 
defined tasks. First, it would evaluate the capital adequacy of 
major banks on a consistent European basis. The definition 
of “major,” or systemic, would combine measures of size and 
cross-border activity. Not all European banks need be so scru-
tinized, but conversely, cross-border effects can occur for any 
very large bank irrespective of its observed cross-border activity 
(thus American bank failures still hit European economies). 
This could encompass between 30 and 50 financial groups, for 
which  the Treuhand  would  conduct  comprehensive  balance 
sheet assessments as the basis for the triage process, with the 
support of national authorities. It would publish the results in a 
consistent manner, without privileging or protecting particular 
banks or national interests. The US stress test experience has 
proved that such publication need not have disruptive market 
effects.  
Second,  it  would  catalyze  the  recapitalization,  or  other 
2. For Treuhandanstalt, a fiduciary entity in German. The word was used 
for the agency that restructured and sold the former Democratic Republic’s 
state-owned businesses from 990 to 994. The German press has also referred 
to Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt, an agency established in late 2008 in the 
context of the banking crisis, as “Bankentreuhand.”
Triage necessarily involves a system-
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restructuring, of the weaker banks. The announcement of triage 
results would trigger market pressure on weaker banks, unlike 
the current situation where opaqueness hampers market disci-
pline. By giving an accurate sense of which banks need what 
amount of fresh capital on a consistent basis, the Treuhand would 
induce the changes needed in national government behavior: 
In keeping with the best traditions of European-level induce-
ments to better economic policy by member states, national 
governments would have to accept transparency about the state 
of their banking systems in the best interest of their countries. 
During that period, the weaker banks would continue to benefit 
from the same guarantees, generally from the home country, as 
they currently rely on.  
Based  on  its  system-wide  insight,  the  Treuhand  would 
broker negotiations among individual states to share the burden 
of recapitalization in cases where outside investors would not 
provide the required funds. The combination of market pres-
sure  and  governments’  existing  commitment  not  to  allow  a 
disorderly bankruptcy should result in eventual restructuring 
agreements.  These  may  involve  the  home  country  but  also 
host governments, irrespective of whether they are Treuhand 
founders or even outside the European Union. The Treuhand 
will greatly enhance the chances of such agreements by being a 
trusted third party, by providing centralization of information, 
and by being able to provide a commonly accepted reference 
for the price of any assets to be transferred into government 
ownership and the economic value of banking franchises and 
operations. Financial expenses associated with each restructur-
ing would be negotiated among countries, thus avoiding politi-
cally unpalatable fiscal federalism. 
This addresses the coordination failures that have long been 
identified as obstacles to efficient cross-border bank resolution 
(Freixas 2004). The respective banks’ home countries will have 
little choice but to make agreements work, especially when the 
announcements by the Treuhand identify the banks at risk, and 
when the shares of those banks are primarily held in the home 
country, if not by the home government. If coordinated across 
the major European banks, this will not simply be a matter of 
one-off operations but of various countries giving and taking 
across the range of banks in question. The initial efforts to 
rescue Fortis and Dexia show that case-by-case burden-sharing 
agreements can be found under pressure. The restructuring may 
also include a haircut on claims held by “old” creditors (before 
the state guarantees extended in 2008–09), which would save 
government money.  
Third, the Treuhand would become the trustee that holds 
bank equity and other assets purchased by national governments 
in  the  restructurings  on  account  for  them.  This  trusteeship 
would save on costs and has a strong precedent in the US RTC 
when dealing with state and local-level institutions. It would 
prevent national politicians from micromanaging bank lending 
decisions or strategies, while retaining clear accountability to 
public owners. It would ensure sound governance of any banks 
brought under public ownership. Moreover, it would prevent 
the destructive games otherwise likely to emerge when it is 
time to sell off the publicly held assets, when national govern-
ments would have an incentive to time their sales so as to grab 
demand before other governments went to market, even if the 
sales might be premature, thus driving down returns to taxpay-
ers and possibly prompting market instability. Conversely, the 
Treuhand could sequence and synchronize sales of assets, thus 
deepening  markets  and  improving  price  discovery,  possibly 
through contracts with private asset managers. 
In legal terms, the participating countries would sign a 
binding Founding Agreement,3 which would govern the tempo-
rary establishment of the Treuhand, including its legal form 
and place of incorporation. Other member states could join at 
a later stage. The Treuhand would be governed by a compact 
board,  accountable  to  participating  governments  and  parlia-
ments, and liaising with EU institutions and council forma-
tions such as Ecofin and the Eurogroup. It would be subject 
to high standards of transparency. The board would appoint a 
chief executive, with significant power over the recruitment, 
compensation, and management of staff in order to meet the 
challenge of building a large, highly skilled organization in a 
very short period of time. Operating expenses, trivial compared 
with the public costs that may arise in recapitalizations, would 
be covered by an ex ante commitment of participating coun-
tries during the Treuhand’s expected lifetime, with allocation 
among countries through a no-nonsense formula such as the 
ECB’s capital key. The Founding Agreement would also commit 
participating countries quickly to pass enabling national legisla-
tion to give the Treuhand direct authority over relevant financial 
firms to execute the tasks outlined above. If decision-making 
is swift, it is not impossible to imagine the Treuhand being in 
place before the end of 2009.4
3. Most likely an international treaty—but this of course would be much 
easier to achieve than an EU treaty, because of fewer participants and no 
unanimity requirement.
4. As an example, the more complex UK Banking Act 2009 was adopted in 
only six months.
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TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE EU FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 
This proposal is short-term and does not by itself provide a 
sustainable policy framework for an integrated EU financial 
system. The De Larosière Report provides a basis for this debate, 
but more is needed. Otherwise, financial fragmentation may be 
irresistible, with negative economic consequences for all stake-
holders.  
In a recent speech, the head of Japan’s Financial Services 
Agency  remarked  that  “[a]  relevant  suggestion  from  Japan’s 
experience [of the 990s] is the need to implement short-term 
measures and medium-term re-design of the regulatory frame-
work in a simultaneous and balanced manner. [...] On the one 
hand, if the policies lean too much toward crisis management, 
it could cause moral hazard or distort the system in the longer 
run. On the other hand, hasty implementation of medium-term 
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measures could rather exacerbate the situation and make crisis 
management even more difficult.”5   
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